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Abstract
The taxation of nuclear energy is studied using a stylized model of the elec-
tricity sector, with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe of
fossil-fuel plants. We show that an unanticipated tax on nuclear production can
generate signicant government revenue in the short run without disturbing the
market, but will harm investment incentives in the long run, especially if the
government cannot credibly commit to a future tax rate. Even if the govern-
ment is capable of credibly committing to an optimal long-run tax, government
revenues from the long-run tax will be very low due to the market power of the
incumbent. Lifetime extension agreements negotiated with multiple potential
players, and competitive auctioning of new nuclear licenses are shown to be the
most attractive policies. The analytical results are illustrated with a numerical
simulation for the case of Belgium.
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Towards the end of 2008, the Belgian government attempted to reduce its
budget decit by imposing a tax of 250 million euro on nuclear power producers.
Despite appeals to the Constitutional Court, the tax was upheld and repeated
as an annual tax in 2009 and 2010. The tax burden is allocated to nuclear
producers in proportion to their capacities, and amounts to around 5 euros per
MWh produced. Meanwhile in Germany, in the second half of 2010, the center-
right government and the nuclear power producers agreed to extend the planned
lifetime of Germany's nuclear power plants in return for a new fuel-rod tax and
a compulsory contribution to a renewable energy fund, later to be replaced by a
renewables levy per MWh produced. The total resulting charge to the nuclear
producers in Germany amounts to slightly over 15 euros per MWh.1
This paper analyzes the short-run and long-run economic implications of
the introduction of such taxes on nuclear production, and compares taxation
with alternative policy measures.2 The economic model is applicable to various
countries. Table 1 provides an overview of European countries that have nuclear
energy in their generation mix. The table also shows that nuclear rms often
have large, concentrated market shares and may therefore be able to exercise
market power on national or regional electricity markets. This is an important
feature of the nuclear sector, which we will explicitly include in this paper using
a `dominant rm { competitive fringe' model. The model allows us to analyze
the dierent types of nuclear rents, the potential for short-run taxation (as in
the above example of Belgium), the possible long-run eects of such taxes, and
alternative policy measures such as comprehensive lifetime extension deals (as in
the German example), auctioning of licenses, and renewables investment quota.
The issue of nuclear rents has been studied from a policy perspective by e.g.
CREG (2010a) and Matthes (2010). CREG (2010b) also study the German
taxation solution. Such studies focus on detailed quantied analysis of specic
cases. Our paper aims to complement this literature by developing a formal
model that allows for graphical and analytical demonstration of the underlying
economic principles.
The oligopolistic nature of our proposed model embodies a number of issues
studied in the vast literature on electricity market deregulation, such as New-
berry's (2002) analysis of the eectiveness of the deregulation process and the
accompanying problems. Indeed, the ongoing policy challenges regarding taxa-
tion of nuclear rents are a consequence of the liberalization of formerly regulated
electricity monopolies. A large number of papers analyze the electricity market
1The information in this paragraph is obtained from articles in De Tijd (March 3 2010 and
December 8 2010), Financial Times (Sep 7 2010) and The Economist (June 2 2011). Note that
as a result of the Fukushima accident, however, the German government eventually annulled
the lifetime extension and maintained the plans for a phase-out by 2022.
2Note that our paper is focused on taxation of economic rents. The Fukushima accident
has illustrated the external cost of nuclear power, which could be addressed separately through
a Pigouvian tax. The latter is not the subject of this paper.






















France 62950 76% 99.7% Expansion ongoing
Germany 19895 23% 50.1% Decommissioning by
2022
Sweden 9248 43% 75.0% Stable
United
Kingdom
9218 13% 100.0% Stable
Spain 7409 19% 61.2% Stable




3775 32% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Switzerland 3220 40% 66.3% Expansion proposals
Finland 2721 30% 100.0% Expansion ongoing
Hungary 1946 37% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Slovakia 1940 58% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Bulgaria 1906 35% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Romania 1310 17% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Slovenia 664 38% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Netherlands 479 4% 100.0% Expansion proposals
Source: Platts (2010), Eurostat (2011).
as an oligopoly and many studies like Borenstein et al. (1999), Bushnell et al.
(2004) and Cardell et al. (1997) focus on the market power of incumbent rms,
which may transform their previous regulated monopoly rights into substantial
unregulated market power.
Our monopolistic `dominant rm { competitive fringe' equilibrium concept
and its oligopolistic extensions are more similar to the typical Cournot models
than to the more sophisticated Supply Function Equilibria (SFE). The advan-
tage of the former is clearly computational convenience, as acknowledged by e.g.
Ventosa et al. (2005), Borenstein et al. (1999), Hobbs & Pang (2007) and Wei
and Smeers (1999). Willems et al. (2009) confront Cournot models and SFE
with data of the German electricity market. The authors conclude that SFE
models do not signicantly outperform the Cournot approach when studying the
German electricity market but that they rely on fewer calibration parameters
and may therefore be more robust. Willems et al. (2009) suggest that Cournot
3models are \...aptly suited for the study of market rules...", while SFE are suited
to study e.g. long-term eects of mergers. In our setting, the Cournot-style ap-
proach seems therefore justied.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our analytical model
of an electricity market with a signicant share of nuclear production, and iden-
ties the dierent types of nuclear rents. Section 3 investigates the potential
magnitude and impact of a nuclear tax in the short run. Next, section 4 demon-
strates the long-run commitment disadvantages of a nuclear tax. Section 5
studies alternative policy measures. Section 6 illustrates the results numerically
for the case of Belgium. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Model set-up
2.1. Demand and supply
We study a stationary electricity market with linear demand:
q(p) = q0   p (1)
with constant parameters q0 and   0. To focus our thoughts, we assume that
this is the electricity market of one single country. The demand q(p) represents
an `average' demand in the course of a year, and we do not consider any demand
variations within the year (or even within the days of the year).3
Two supply technologies are available: (i) nuclear generation with short-run
marginal production cost cn, and (ii) fossil-fuel-based generation with linearly
increasing short-run marginal production costs c0+q. Because of the low short-
run marginal production costs of nuclear power, we assume cn  c0. Nuclear
generation qn is limited by the installed nuclear capacity qn;inst. Furthermore,
we assume that there is a limit qn;max to the amount of nuclear capacity that can
be installed: qn;inst  qn;max. The constraint may be due to various reasons:
technical (e.g. access to cooling, or insucient ability of nuclear power to cope
with demand variability), political, ethical, etc. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume qn;inst = qn;max, i.e. nuclear capacity has already been installed up
to maximum allowable level. The cost curve c0 + q also includes any relevant
foreign production capacity that can be imported. Additional transmission costs
for foreign production are included in c0 + q.
2.2. Equilibrium concept
We consider a `dominant rm { competitive fringe' game, which is fairly
standard in microeconomic analysis.4 We assume that all nuclear production
3As we will see below, supply and demand are assumed to always intersect in the same
linear part of the supply curve, so the `average' demand corresponds to the `average' price. In
this case, the fact that we analyze only the average demand is therefore not a restriction per
se.
4See e.g. Carlton and Perlo (2000).
4capacity is controlled by one `dominant rm'. Considering the strong concen-
tration in nuclear power as shown in Table 1, this assumption is not unrealistic,
and serves as a `worst case' baseline for the cases with more than one producer.
The fossil-fuel and foreign capacity represented by c0 + q is assumed to be
controlled by a `competitive fringe'. In this model, the dominant rm behaves
strategically, while the competitive fringe always behaves fully competitively
(and hence always produces up to the point where price equals marginal cost).
Figure 1 illustrates our equilibrium concept. The thick black line is the




















industry marginal cost curve. Under perfect competition, the market equilbrium
would be at point A, the intersection of the industry marginal cost curve and
the demand curve. Since it is in practice technically impossible to serve an
entire electricity system with nuclear power, we assume that the intersection of
supply and demand is always in the upward sloping part of the supply curve
(i.e. the part provided by the competitive fringe). The equilibrium price and










q0   (c0   qn;max)
1 + 
(3)
In our `dominant rm { competitive fringe' model, however, the equilibrium
can be determined by considering the residual demand curve (i.e. demand minus
5the quantities supplied by the competitive fringe) and analyzing the dominant
rm as a monopolist on this residual demand curve.5 As shown in Figure 1,
the residual demand curve translates into a marginal revenue curve (MRn) of
the dominant rm. If nuclear capacity was not constrained by qn;inst then the
`dominant rm { competitive fringe' equilibrium would be at point B, i.e. the
intersection of MRn and the dominant rm's (constant) marginal cost curve.
However, given the nuclear capacity constraint (qn  qn;inst), the dominant
rm's quantity decision qn becomes equal to qn;inst = qn;max. As a result, the
equilibrium prices and quantities are the same as under perfect competition, at
least in the case shown in Figure 1. Only with high operating costs and large
capacity would the dominant nuclear have an interest in exploiting his market
power by not fully using the available capacity. However, due to the relatively
low short-run marginal cost of nuclear production, the constraint qn  qn;inst
is generally binding. As a result, in this model, even a single dominant nuclear
rm typically does not have an incentive to withhold production. In order to
keep our argument focused, we will assume that { in the absence of taxes on
nuclear production { the constraint qn  qn;inst is indeed binding.
This assumption can be expressed mathematically. From equation (1) and
the cost curve of the competitive fringe, we can easily derive the inverse residual
demand curve pR(q), and subsequently MRn:
pR(q) =




c0 + (q0   2q)
1 + 
(5)
In the absence of the constraint qn  qn;inst, the nuclear rm's unconstrained








The constraint qn  qn;inst will be binding i qn;inst  qn;uncon. Since we
assume qn;inst = qn;max, that condition can be expressed as:




The rst two terms of the right-hand side together (q0  cn) are slightly larger
than total electricity demand, hence it is reasonable to assume qn;max  q0  
cn. The last term (c0  cn)= is also large, because the dierence in short-run
marginal production cost between nuclear power and the mostly fossil-fuel red
5Note that our model description implicitly provides the dominant rm with a Stackelberg
leadership position vis- a-vis the competitive fringe. Ulph and Folie (1980) analyze an alter-
native conguration, in which a Nash equilibrium is reached between the dominant rm and
the competitive fringe, and nd that this leads to a number of undesirable properties, hence
we do not consider this option here.
6power plants of the competitive fringe is large, and because the slope of the
fringe cost curve is not very steep. With the calibration parameters of Section
6, condition (7) is satised for all European countries in Table 1.
2.3. Rents
Figure 1 demonstrates that nuclear producers obtain a rent (p
0   cn)qn.
Three types of rent can be distinguished.
First, a large part is the perfectly competitive inframarginal rent required
to cover the xed costs (mostly investment costs) incurred by the nuclear rm.
Indeed, while short-run marginal production costs are relatively low, the upfront
capital investment of nuclear power is comparatively high. The discounted sum
of inframarginal rents needs to cover that investment cost in order to provide
sucient investment incentives. We assume that the sum of the annuity of
investment costs plus any relevant xed operating costs is given by fnqn;inst.
Secondly, there may be a scarcity rent. Indeed, without the constraint
qn;max, the long-run equilibrium installed capacity of nuclear power would evolve
such that the electricity price equals fn + cn. As a result of the constraint, the
nuclear rm in Figure 1 obtains a scarcity rent (p
0   cn   fn)qn.
Thirdly, nuclear rms may obtain rents due to market power. In Figure 1,
no withholding takes place, hence there is no market power rent. As mentioned
before, the low level of short-run marginal costs makes short-run withholding of
nuclear capacity unlikely in general. However, as we will see below, there may
be circumstances (e.g. in the event of nuclear taxation) that can lead to the
long-run variety of withholding, namely underinvestment.
2.4. Government
In this paper, we study the policy options of the national government of
the country under consideration. We assume that the government maximizes
national welfare W:
W = CS + nn + G (8)
with CS the consumer surplus, n the prots of the nuclear rm, n (0  n 
1) the fraction of the nuclear rm's shares owned by nationals of the country,
G the government revenues from the nuclear sector (taxes, licenses, etc.), and 
the marginal cost of public funds6. We ignore the potential contribution of the
competitive fringe's prots to national welfare. The choice of  depends on the
view one takes regarding government revenues. An assumption  = 0 implies
that government revenues are wasted. On the other hand, assuming  > 1 im-
plies that nuclear revenues are used productively to reduce other taxes, thereby
eliminating distortions elsewhere in the economy. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume  = 1 in the remainder of this paper. Note that if, for ideological or
other reasons, the government does not attach any importance to the income of
the nuclear rm's national shareholders, this is equivalent to setting n = 0.
6See e.g. Browning (1976).




q(p)dp = ( p   p)q0  

2
( p2   p2) (9)
with p the market price of electricity in the equilibrium under consideration.
3. Short-run taxation potential
We now consider the introduction of an unexpected tax on nuclear produc-
tion, as it happened in the case of Belgium. `Unexpected' means that the tax
was not anticipated at the time of investment in the nuclear capacity. We con-
sider a tax of  per unit of nuclear electricity produced. The eect is illustrated
in Figure 2. For the nuclear rm, the tax increases the short-run marginal cost
of production from cn to cn + . As a result, the intersection point of MRn
and MCn moves from point B to point C. If  is high enough, the intersection
point may shift to point D or beyond. When the intersection point is beyond
point D (indicated with a little arrow in Figure 2) the constraint qn  qn;inst is
no longer binding and the nuclear rm withholds some of its capacity.

















Proposition 1. Under the assumptions of Section 2 and the additional condi-
tion that:







8the government's optimal choice of the short-run nuclear tax rate is:
~ sr =
c0 + (q0   2qn;max)
1 + 
  cn (11)
Proof. First, observe that ~ sr is the maximum tax rate the government can
impose without causing the nuclear rm to withhold. This can be easily seen
by replacing cn with cn +  in equation (7) and solving for .
Lowering the tax rate below ~ sr keeps the constraint qn  qn;inst binding,
hence it does not change the equilibrium. The only eect of lowering the tax
rate below ~ sr is a linear transfer from government revenue to nuclear prots.
Since n  1 this cannot increase the government's objective function W in
equation (8). This is shown in Figure 3, for   ~ sr.









Raising the tax rate  above ~ sr leads to withholding. The constraint qn 
qn;inst is not binding anymore and nuclear production qn;1 is given by equation











which can be substituted into equation (9) for CS. Using also G = qn;1, one
can derive an analytical expression for the government's objective function Wwh
in case of withholding, which is a concave quadratic function of . As mentioned






However, due to condition (10), this value peak is lower than ~ sr, hence it is
outside the domain where withholding takes place. As a result, W declines with
9 when   ~ sr, as is illustrated in Figure 3. This result is also valid if n  0,
because then peak will be even smaller since in this case a larger  contributes
an additional negative term to W through .
Since it is impossible to increase W { neither by lowering  below ~ sr nor
by raising it above ~ sr { the choice  = ~ sr must be an optimal value.
Condition (10) is very similar to condition (7), but slightly more restrictive.
With the calibration parameters of Section 6 the condition is satised when the
maximum nuclear capacity represents less than 60% of total demand. Except
for France, this is satised for all countries in Table 1.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that it is possible (and optimal in the short run)
for governments to impose a substantial7 unexpected tax on nuclear production,
without even aecting the equilibrium on the electricity market. The next
section will study the long-run eects of such a tax.
4. Long-run eects of taxation on reinvestment
The government's ability and incentives to introduce ex-post taxes on nu-
clear production in the short run, as in the previous section, may hamper in-
vestments in new nuclear capacity { or any other generating capacity with high
capital costs { because rms may fear expropriation of prots. This is a well-
known problem in the tax competition literature. Janeba (2000) uses a model
in which one rm produces for the world market and its prots are taxed by
the government. When the production has to be local, there is a standard time
inconsistency problem. The government has an interest to raise the tax after
the investment, the rm understands this ex ante and the rm would never
invest. In Janeba's model this problem can be avoided by the rm at a high
cost by building extra capacity in another country and to shift production to
the country where the net prot is the highest. According to Janeba, when
capacity costs are suciently low, this is the equilibrium. For higher capacity
costs, there is an equilibrium without investment. In our case, even if there is
enough international transmission capacity, high (nuclear) capacity costs would
rule out an equilibrium with excess capacities. A second way to avoid the time
inconsistency problem is to rely on other constraints on the behavior of gov-
ernments. One legal option is to have constitutions that rule out governments
changing the tax rules. This type of rule exists in order to limit government
debt but is rather naive as governments have by denition the power to tax
prots more and lower other taxes. A second constraint could be reputation.
In order to assess this constraint we need a behavioral model of the government
as an agent that desires to be reelected by its voters (Besley, 2006). A govern-
ment raising taxes ex post can be seen as an unreliable government by investors
but voters with a shorter-term memory and/or perceiving the nuclear tax as a
justied tax on excess prots or compensating nuclear risks may consider such
7An indication of the likely size of such a tax is provided in Section 6.
10a government as defending its interests. The best evidence is that in countries
such as Germany and Belgium, such an ex-post nuclear tax has been agreed
upon in Parliament. In conclusion, credible commitments not to raise the tax
ex post are dicult. The remainder of this section therefore considers multiple
cases, with dierent levels of commitment.
Subsection 4.1 rst analyzes the eects of the tax ~ sr (from equation (11))
on investment incentives, when this tax is made permanent and the government
is able to commit to it. Subsection 4.2 investigates a situation in which the
government cannot make any credible commitment. Subsection 4.3 investigates
the opposite situation, in which the government is capable of making credible
commitments to an optimal long-run tax rate, which would be lower than ~ sr.
4.1. Credible commitment to the short-run tax rate
Suppose the government imposes a tax ~ sr on current nuclear power pro-
duction, according to Proposition 1. When the current nuclear capacity expires
and needs to be replaced, nuclear rms will take the tax ~ sr into account when
making the reinvestment decision. In this subsection we assume that the gov-
ernment can credibly commit to maintaining { i.e. not increasing { ~ sr after the
replacement capacity has been built.
In their long-run reinvestment decision, rms will not only take into account
the short-run marginal cost cn and the tax ~ sr but also the xed (investment)
costs fn per unit of capacity built. Figure 4 illustrates the decision of the nuclear
rm. The relevant marginal cost curve is now MCn;lr, which intersects with
Figure 4: Long-run impact of an unexpected tax on nuclear investments, assuming government






















MRn at E instead of D. The resulting reinvestment decision can be found by





q0   (cn + ~ sr + fn) +




Using equation (11) this can be simplied to:




which is obviously lower than the technical maximum qn;max.8
With the existing fringe capacity marginal cost curve, the reduction of nu-
clear capacity from qn;inst = qn;max to qn;reinv increases electricity prices from
p
0 to p







i.e. the underinvestment in nuclear capacity due to the introduction of a tax
according to Proposition 1, may lead to an increase in electricity prices equal
to half the per-unit xed (investment) cost.9
4.2. No credible commitment
The caveat with Figure 4 is that once the capacity qn;reinv is installed,
the government would be incentivized to increase the tax rate above ~ sr. In
Figure 4, the government could increase the tax to ~ sr +fn without causing any
withholding of the capacity qn;reinv. In fact, by analogy with Proposition 1,
it is easy to see that for any level of qn;reinv the government's optimal ex-post
short-run tax ~ 0
sr can be found by following the MRn curve:
~ 0
sr = MRn   cn (17)
A rational nuclear rm anticipates the government's ex-post tax increases. Hence,
the MCn;lr curve changes to include the ex-post tax increase:
MCn;lr = cn + fn + ~ 0
sr = fn + MRn (18)
For fn > 0 there is no more intersection between MCn;lr and MRn, hence no
nuclear capacity is built if the government cannot make any credible commit-
ment regarding the future tax rate.
8In the case shown in the gure, we have fn  ~ sr, so that in the absence of taxes even a
single dominant rm would reinvest up to the the full technical maximum qn;max. If fn > ~ sr,
this need not be the case but the resulting capacity in the case with taxes is always lower
than in the case without taxes.
9For the sake of simplicity, we have implicitly assumed that long-run price elasticity of
electricity demand is the same as in the short run. In reality, in the long run, households may
adapt and industries may decide to relocate to other countries, so long-run demand would be
less inelastic.
12Full loss of commitment power of the government is not required to create
the conditions for underinvestment. Indeed, the possibility of the government
changing tax rates ex-post, may be sucient to deter investment. Suppose that
there is a probability  that the government makes an ex-post decision to apply
the tax ~ 0
sr according to equation (17). Conversely, with probability (1   ),
the government does not apply any tax. A risk-neutral rm will behave as if
government imposed the expected value of the tax, i.e. the weighted average
~ 0
sr. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The nuclear rm's reinvestment decision
is at point F, the intersection of MRn and MCn;lr, with the latter including
the expected value of the tax. As  increases, the point F moves further up
the MRn curve { as indicated with a little arrow { and reinvestment is further
reduced. One can show that qn;reinv becomes 0 when:





Hence, reinvestment may be completely deterred even if it is not certain that
the government cannot commit to a tax rate.
Figure 5: Long-run impact of an unexpected tax on nuclear investments, assuming a proba-













4.3. Credible commitment to optimal tax rate
Let us assume that the government can choose a tax rate before the nuclear
rm's reinvestment decision, and that the government can make a credible com-
mitment to maintain this tax rate after the capacity has been built. By analogy
with Proposition 1, essentially by replacing cn with cn + fn, we can derive the
13government's optimal choice of the tax rate. However, since fn may be large,
the analog of condition (10) is not necessarily fullled, hence two cases need to
be considered.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Section 2, the optimal choice of the
nuclear tax rate for a government capable of making credible commitments is:
~ lr = max

~ sr   fn ;




Proof. The proof is analogous to Proposition 1. For   ~ sr fn, the constraint
qn;reinv  qn;max is binding, and lowering  below ~ sr   fn cannot increase W.
For  > ~ sr   fn the constraint is not binding anymore. In the absence of
the constraint, the government's objective function W has a peak at:
peak =
(1   n)(c0   cn   fn)   nq0
2   n
(21)
Note that, unlike in equation (13), we have not set n = 0. With n = 0 and
fn = 0 the two equations obviously become identical again.
If peak  ~ sr fn then W declines when  is raised above ~ sr fn, similar to
the situation in Figure 3. If peak > ~ sr fn, then the maximum of W is reached
for  = peak. Combining both cases, we nd ~ lr = maxf~ sr  fn ; peakg, hence
equation (20).
Note that ~ lr according to equation (20) is not necessarily positive, for ex-
ample when n = 1 and fn > ~ sr. In general, it is easy to see that large fn will
make ~ lr small or negative. The government therefore faces a trade-o: on the
one hand, short-run welfare maximization would require taxing current nuclear
capacity at a rate ~ sr, but this would harm government credibility thereby ham-
pering reinvestment. On the other hand, the optimal long-run tax rate ~ lr in
this setting is rather low. If, in order to preserve its credibility, the government
decides to apply ~ lr also to current capacity, this would leave a very large part
of current nuclear rents untouched. Ideally, the government would be able to
make a credible commitment to distinguish its tax rate on current capacity from
its tax rate on new capacity, but this may be dicult to do.
5. Alternative policy instruments
The previous section has highlighted the challenges of imposing an unex-
pected short-run tax on a dominant nuclear rm. In this section we explore
alternative policy measures.
5.1. Lifetime extension agreements
Belgium's government rst decided to extend the lifetime of the country's
nuclear power plants. Only later, it imposed a contested tax on nuclear produc-
ers. An alternative is the German approach, in which a tax was agreed between
14government and the nuclear rms in return for a lifetime extension.10 The latter
option is arguably preferable from the perspective of government credibility and
investment incentives.
We can analyze such a lifetime extension agreement using the reasoning of
Section 4.3. Indeed, lifetime extension is very similar to reinvestment, but the
reinvestment cost fn is replaced by a signicantly lower refurbishment cost f0
n.
We simplify the bargaining process between the government and the nuclear
industry by assuming a Stackelberg structure in which the government credibly
commits to a tax rate  in the rst stage, and the dominant nuclear rm responds
in a second stage by deciding on how much of the nuclear capacity will have its
lifetime extended. The optimal tax to be set in return for a lifetime extension
can then be derived from Proposition 2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
n = 0, so that the optimal tax rate is:
 = max

~ sr   f0
n ;





which can be conveniently analyzed graphically, as in Figure 6, where (c0 cn 
f0
n)=2 < ~ sr  f0
n, hence  = ~ sr  fn. We shall maintain this assumption in this
and the next section.



















n  fn, the agreed tax  allows the government to capture at
least a sizeable part of the nuclear lifetime extension rent (p
0   cn   f0
n)qn;inst.
10The lifetime extension was later revoked in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident,
which is, in fact, an illustration of ineective government commitment.
15The part captured by the government is indicated in light shading in Figure
6. However, a large part of the rent { shown in dark shading in Figure 6 {
cannot be captured through a lifetime extension and taxation agreement with a
dominant nuclear rm, because a further increase of the tax rate would trigger
a reduction of the amount of capacity of which the lifetime is extended, and
therefore lead to lower tax revenues.
5.2. Auctioning
The main underlying reason why a large part of the nuclear rent cannot be
captured in the setting of Figure 6, is the fact that the nuclear rm is assumed to
be a monopolist on the residual demand curve. One way to increase the share of
rent captured by taxes { and thus increase welfare { is to introduce competition.
More specically, the government could open up the lifetime extension licensing
not only to the incumbent dominant rm but also to other players, in an auction.
Suppose there are k players, including the incumbent. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we model the auctioning process as a Cournot game between nuclear
rms. First the government sets a lifetime extension tax k, as in Section 5.1.
Then, in Cournot competition, the k players each decide on an amount of the
capacity to be extended. In the previous sections, the response of the dominant
rm as a function of costs plus taxes, was always given by MRn, which, as
is well-known, has twice the slope of the inverse residual demand curve. In a
Cournot game the resulting total quantity of the k players, as a function of costs
plus taxes, is a similar line, but with a slope of (k +1)=k times the slope of the
inverse residual demand curve. This is shown in Figure 7. The reasoning from
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Section 5.1 can now be applied almost identically. The optimal tax rate 1 in
16the case of one dominant rm is the same as in Section 5.1. The optimal tax
rates k for k > 1 become larger and larger, thereby allowing the government
to capture an ever larger share of the nuclear rent. In the limit case of perfect
competition (k ! 1) the tax becomes 1 = p
0   cn   f0
n, and the government
captures the entire nuclear rent. There may however be some drawbacks to this
approach. In particular, the auctioning process may suer from asymmetric
information. Indeed, the nuclear rm currently operating the power plant may
have private information that is unavailable to other potential contenders in the
auction. Furthermore, if ownership changes as a result of the lifetime extension
auction, the power plant may continue to be operated by the original owner,
which could lead to principal-agent problems.
In this section, we have applied the auctioning mechanism to the lifetime
extension decision. Clearly, the same auctioning mechanism can be applied to
the reinvestment decision.
5.3. Other taxation instruments
In this paper, the optimal nuclear energy tax has been derived for the case of
an excise tax on nuclear production. This is a xed amount per MWh of nuclear
energy produced. Alternatively, the government could opt for an ad valorem
tax, a prot tax, or a lump sum tax. The former two taxes are in fact similar in
structure to the excise tax we have considered so far. In theory, in the case of a
pure monopoly, an ad valorem tax { proportional to the nuclear rm's revenues
{ yields a larger nuclear output for the same tax revenue than an excise tax.11
In our case however, the dierence will be small since cn is small. A special
prot tax { proportional to the nuclear rm's prots { circumvents the problem
of withholding, since the nuclear rm's incentives remain unaltered. However,
it leads to the same long-term investment problems as the excise tax discussed
so far. Moreover, the special nuclear prot tax may be dicult to implement:
rms may attempt to evade the nuclear prot tax by inating costs, shifting
costs between non-nuclear and nuclear plants, or overstating the allocation of
overhead costs to nuclear subsidiaries. From a legal perspective, it may be
challenging to tax the same prot twice, i.e. both through regular corporate
taxation and through the special nuclear prot tax. In any case, the prot
tax bears some resemblance to the excise tax, because also the optimal excise
tax depends on the dierence between the price of the fossil fuel alternative
(via c0) and the marginal cost of nuclear power (cn). A pure lump sum tax, set
independently of nuclear output, is a superior instrument compared to the excise
tax. However, in many countries, lump sum taxes would not be constitutional
as they are not linked to a dened tax base.
5.4. Mandatory investments in renewable energy
Instead of pure taxation, governments are also considering the possibility of
obliging nuclear producers to invest a part of the nuclear rent in renewable en-
11See e.g. Salani e (2003).
17ergy. For instance, the annulled German lifetime extension agreement included
a compulsory contribution to a renewable energy fund. In fact, such a scheme is
conceptually equivalent to the combination of a tax plus a commitment to invest
the tax revenues in renewable energy. Hence, it is only optimal if renewable en-
ergy investments are indeed the best use of tax money, among all other possible
government investment options. This seems unlikely, unless one assumes that
other government expenditures are generally wasted, i.e.  in equation (8) very
small.
6. Numerical simulations for the case of Belgium
6.1. Calibration and baseline
In this section we apply the results from previous sections to a numerical
simulation for the case of Belgium. Table 2 lists the calibration parameters.
More information on how these values are obtained, can be found in Appendix
A. We assume  = 1 as before. Unless specied otherwise, we assume n = 0,
Table 2: Numerical values of parameters for the case of Belgium.
Parameter Value Unit
q0 9422 MW








 0.0053 EUR/MWh / MW
i.e. there are no local shareholders of the nuclear rm, or the government does
not include their interests in its objective function.
Since demand is assumed to be completely inelastic ( = 0), the equilibrium
quantity in the absence of any intervention is obviously q
0 = 9422 MW. The
equilibrium price in the absence of any intervention is p
0 = 60:9 EUR/MWh, a
fairly realistic number.
The total rent obtained by the nuclear rm in this model is given by:
(p
0   cn)qn = 1910 million EUR (23)
which is in line with the estimate of 1.75 to 2.3 billion EUR made by the Belgian
electricity regulator CREG (2011). It should be emphasized that the estimation
of the nuclear rent is not the objective of our model. Rather, the similarity with
CREG (2011) indicates that the calibration of the model is likely to be fairly
realistic.
186.2. Taxation and the eect on new investments
The parameters of Table 2 fulll condition (10). The optimal unanticipated
short-run tax according to Proposition 1 is:
~ sr = 12:5 EUR/MWh (24)
and the corresponding government revenues G are 584 million EUR per year.
This tax is quite a bit higher than the 5 EUR/MWh tax introduced by the
Belgian government in 2008, but it still captures only 31% of the total rent.
In the longer run, if the 12.5 EUR/MWh tax is credibly maintained for new
nuclear investment when current capacity has expired, then equation (15) in-
dicates that only 39% of nuclear capacity will be replaced. This is obviously
dependent on the assumption that there is only one nuclear rm that can de-
cide to invest in Belgium. The resulting electricity price increase according to
equation (16) would be 17:4 EUR/MWh. Note that in this dominant rm {
competitive fringe model, with only one nuclear rm, the nuclear rm would
not replace all nuclear capacity even if no tax is imposed (see footnote 8). In-
deed, even in the absence of any taxes, the dominant nuclear rm would only
reinvest in 61% of capacity. Still, the 12.5 EUR/MWh tax reduces reinvestment
by more than a third.12
If no taxes are imposed on new nuclear capacity but there is a probability 
that the government will impose a short-run optimal tax ex-post, new nuclear
investment may also be severely reduced, as explained in Section 4.2. Figure 8
shows how the amount of replacement capacity qn;reinv changes as a function of
. According to equation (19), as soon as   0:50, there will be no more nuclear
investment. In other words: in this dominant rm { competitive fringe model,
a 1-in-2 chance of an ex-post nuclear tax, of which the level will be decided by
the government after investment, is sucient to deter all investment.
Let us now consider the case in which the government can set a long-term tax
rate ~ lr for new investment according to Proposition 2 and commit to it. Figure
9 shows the optimal tax ~ lr as a function of n, the share of local shareholders
in the nuclear rm. The optimal tax is the maximum of two alternatives: ~ lr  
fn and peak, as explained in Proposition 2. Interestingly, the optimal tax is
negative, even when n is very low. Since the dominant rm has an incentive to
reinvest less than the technical maximum, it is optimal for the government to
subsidize the construction of nuclear power, in order to prevent underinvestment
and too low production. The subsidy is 7:8 EUR/MWh when n = 0, and
increases with n up to a maximum of 22:2 EUR/MWh for n = 0:51, after
which it remains constant because the maximum possible reinvestment qn;max
is reached.
12An obvious question is then why the current capacity qn;max has been built in the rst
place, given that a monopolist would build less capacity according to our model. One likely
explanation is that the capacity was built during the time of regulated monopoly, in which
the incumbent electricity rm would operate in a cost-plus scheme, and not on a free market
as in our model.
19Figure 8: Reinvestment in nuclear capacity as a function of the probability  that government
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206.3. Lifetime extension agreement and auctioning
Let us now analyze the case of a lifetime extension agreement between the
government and the nuclear rm. As mentioned in Section 5.1 the problem is
similar to the question of reinvestment treated in the previous section, but with
a lower cost f0
n instead of fn. Applying equation (22) we nd:
~ sr   f0
n = 5:6 EUR/MWh (25)
c0   cn   f0
n
2
= 6:2 EUR/MWh (26)
hence the optimal tax is 6.2 EUR/MWh. The situation is slightly dierent from
what is depicted in Figure 6 in that the government will increase the tax rate
slightly above the point where the nuclear rm starts to withhold capacity from
the lifetime extension. This eect disappears when multiple nuclear rms are
invited to an auction of lifetime extension licenses, as in Section 5.2. With more
than one player, in this numerical setting, the government will set exactly the
maximum tax rate that will make sure the lifetime of all capacity gets extended.
Figure 10 shows the optimal lifetime extension tax as a function of the number
of players k in the auction. The total potential rent in this case is 1588 million













EUR, which is less than the nuclear rent of 1910 million EUR mentioned earlier
because of the lifetime extension cost f0
n. With one player, the above-mentioned
tax of 6.2 EUR/MWh captures only 18% of this rent. With more than one
player, the taxation potential rapidly increases with k: in an auction with three
players, the government would set a tax of 24.5 EUR/MWh, capturing 72% of
21the maximum potential. In a perfectly competitive setting, i.e. when k ! 1,
the government can capture the full rent with a tax of 33.9 EUR/MWh.
As mentioned before, the same principle can be applied to the auctioning
of new nuclear power plant licenses, if the government can credibly commit to
an optimal long-run tax rate. The total potential rent is much smaller, because
fn  f0
n. In this numerical simulation, the total rent would be 286 million EUR
per year. However, a large number of players would be required in order for the
government to capture a signicant share of this rent, as shown in Figure 11.
For k = 1 and k = 2, we obviously nd again the subsidy of 7.8 EUR/MWh
Figure 11: Long-term tax on new nuclear investments as a function of the number of partici-















shown earlier in Figure 9. For higher k the subsidy decreases, and becomes a
tax when k  5. In the fully competitive situation in which k ! 1, the tax is
6.1 EUR/MWh and the entire rent is captured by the government.
The main numerical results are summarized in Table 3.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied nuclear taxation using a stylized model of the
electricity sector with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe
of fossil-fuel plants. The graphical and analytical results are illustrated using a
numerical simulation for the case of Belgium.
We nd that an unanticipated tax on nuclear production can generate signif-
icant government revenues in the short run without disturbing the equilibrium
on the electricity market. In the simulation, the optimal short-run tax is 12.5
22Table 3: Summary of numerical results.
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23EUR/MWh and captures around 31% of the total nuclear rent. However, the
tax may harm reinvestment incentives in new nuclear capacity in the long run.
Assuming the government commits to maintaining the short-run tax rate in the
long run, reinvestment is reduced by a third in the simulation, compared to a
situation without the tax. If the probability that the government cannot com-
mit to a tax rate is higher than 50%, reinvestment is completely deterred. If,
on the other hand, the government can credibly commit to an optimal long-run
tax rate, government revenues would be very low because the socially optimal
tax would be very small or negative, due to the market power of the nuclear
rm.
An agreement on lifetime extension between the government and a dominant
nuclear producer generates less revenues than the unanticipated tax (18% of the
lifetime extension rent in the simulation). However, by inviting multiple com-
peting bidders for the lifetime extension licenses, government revenues increase
rapidly: in the simulation, a lifetime extension negotiation with three bidders
captures 72% of the rent for the government. Likewise, inviting multiple play-
ers to bid for reinvestment in new nuclear capacity can increase the potential
revenues from reinvestment in new capacity because it can make the socially
optimal tax positive.
Government credibility has proven to be crucial for enabling long-run opti-
mal nuclear taxation policy. One way to achieve such credibility is to transfer
some authority to a supranational body, so that appeals are possible when tax-
ation agreements are not honored. The sensitive nature of taxation may make
such a transfer dicult to realize in practice, however.
Our stylized representation of the electricity market of a country with nu-
clear power could be further rened. In particular, it would be useful to enhance
the integration of international imports in our model, as these may be quite im-
portant in the event of large underinvestment. Furthermore, since our analysis
shows that multi-party negotiation of lifetime extension agreements and auc-
tioning of new nuclear licenses seem to be the most attractive policies, further
research on the details of such auctioning processes would be benecial.
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Appendix A. Industry marginal cost curve for the Belgian electricity
sector
We estimate coecients c0 and  based on a cost curve of Belgian electricity
supply for the year 2010. The Belgian Transmission System Operator Elia pro-
vides data on available total power per 15-minute time slice. Average available
total power in 2010 was 11927 MW (Elia, 2011). Table A.4 provides a break-
down of available capacity by fuel.13 Elia (2011) also provides the available
amounts of international import transmission capacity from neighboring coun-
tries to Belgium, shown in Table A.5. The latter capacities are relevant, since
the fringe cost curve c0+q should also include potential imports, as mentioned
in Section 2.1.
Data on eciencies, emissions and maintenance costs per technology are
taken from European Commission (2008) and summarized in Table A.6. Coal,
gas and oil14 prices are based on the average price over the period 2006-2010
according to BP (2011). Nuclear fuel price is taken from the European Commis-
sion (2008), and includes provisions for waste management. Table A.7 provides
an overview.
13Note that the available nuclear capacity is less than in Table 1, because not all capacity
is available at any given time. Overall, average total available capacity is much lower than
total installed capacity, which was 17084 MW in 2010 according to Elia (2011).
14For simplicity we do not distinguish crude oil from the various rened products used in
power generation. Since oil-based generation is anyhow located at the far right-hand side of
the cost curve, this does not signicantly aect results.
26Table A.4: Average available power generation capacity by fuel.











Table A.5: International import transmission capacity from neighboring countries to Belgium.






In order to construct the industry marginal cost curve, we make a number
of additional assumptions:
 The large majority of hydropower in Belgium is pumped storage, which
does not make a net contribution to the power supply. The 1480 MW of
hydropower in Table A.4 is therefore excluded from the analysis.
 The available capacities for Wind and Other in Table A.4 are assumed
to be non-dispatchable capacity, i.e. they do not run as a function of
demand but as a result of another constraint (wind, cogeneration of heat
and power, etc.). We therefore subtract them from demand (using a 50%
load factor) and do not include them in the cost curve.
Table A.6: Techno-economic characteristics of power plant technologies.
Technology Typical characteristics
Eciency CO2 Emissions Maintenance costs
Percent kg/MWh EUR/MWh
Nuclear { Fission 35% 0 12.1
Coal { PCC 47% 725 8.1
Coal { CFBC 40% 850 9.4
Gas { CCGT 58% 350 3.4
Gas { GT 38% 530 5.4
Oil { CC 53% 505 6.7
Source: European Commission (2008).
27Table A.7: Fuel prices.
Fuel Reference Price
EUR/MWh(thermal)
Coal Northwest Europe marker 2006-2010 8.3
Gas European Union cif 2006-2010 21.9
Oil Brent (dated) 2006-2010 32.2
Nuclear Price cited by European Commission (2008) 2.8
Source: BP (2011), European Commission (2008).
 Older coal plants typically have lower eciencies than the Best Available
Technology (BAT) eciencies listed in Table A.6. For the purpose of the
coal part of our cost curve, we therefore use the least favorable character-
istics among the two coal technologies listed in Table A.6.
 Imported generation from the Netherlands is assumed to be gas-based.
 Imported generation from France is assumed to be coal-based. Although
France has very large nuclear capacity, our model does predict that this
capacity is already fully utilized, due to its low marginal costs (see Section
2.2). On average, it would therefore not be able to make an incremental
contribution to serving Belgian load. A similar argument can be made
for France's large hydropower capacity. The next largest technology in
France's generation system is coal (Platts, 2010).
 To take into account the additional transmission costs incurred by import-
ing power from neighboring countries, a at fee of 12.0 EUR per MWh
is added to the cost of imported power. This value corresponds to the
average revenue of Elia (2011) per MWh of load in Belgium.
 The maintenance costs cited in Table A.6 comprise both xed (FOM) and
variable (VOM) costs. For the industry marginal cost curve, only the
variable part should be included. We assume this variable part is 50% of
the maintenance cost.
 The carbon emissions allowance price is assumed to be 15 EUR per tonne.
The resulting industry marginal cost curve is shown in Figure A.12. Based
on this cost curve, one can estimate c0 = 39:3 EUR/MWh and  = 0:0053
EUR/MWh/MW. The gure also shows the net demand, which, after subtrac-
tion of the Wind and Other capacities, is q0 = 9422 MW. Demand is assumed
to be completely inelastic:  = 0.
The xed capital charge fn for nuclear power is estimated using the capex
estimate provided by the European Commission (2008), but with a lower dis-
count rate: 7%, which is in line with the pre-tax weighted average cost of capital
of a large European utility (see e.g. E.ON, 2009), instead of the 10% discount
rate suggested by the European Commission (2008). The result is fn = 34:7
EUR/MWh. For the variable cost cn of nuclear power, we include not only the
















marginal cost of 14.1 EUR/MWh, as shown in Figure A.12 but also the FOM of
6.0 EUR/MWh, bringing the total to cn = 20:1 EUR/MWh. Indeed, although
the industry marginal cost curve { as used for pricing { does not include the
FOM, the FOM will be relevant for the nuclear rm in deciding whether or not
to withhold some of its nuclear capacity over the timeframe of a year. Finally,
we assume that the xed capital charge for lifetime extension is 20% of fn:
f0
n = 6:9 EUR/MWh.
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